EUPHRASY.

or

POLITICAL EYEBRIGHT

Written in the Year 1768,

In consequence of a contested Election for Members to serve in Parliament for the Borough of Ipswich in the County of Suffolk.

When the laudable and truly patriotic Principles of True Blue *were forced to give way to Bribery and Corruption, Ministerial Influence, and Presbyterian Faction, with every other undue and unconstitutional Measure.*

CANDIDATES.

Blues.	Yellows.
Hon.ble Wilbraham Tollemache.	*Thomas Staunton.* } *Esq.rs*
Edw.d Holden Cruttenden Esq.r	*William Wollaston.* }

BRITISH MUSEUM

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER I.

— — — — VIVITE FORTES:
FORTIAQUE ADVERSIS APPONITE PECTORA REBUS. HOR.

THE deſign of theſe Papers is to purge the eyes of my Countrymen who are of the eſtabliſhed religion of this kingdom, the Church of England, from a miſt which ſeems almoſt to have darkened the mental ſight of too many of its members, and to have rendered their underſtandings in a manner uſeleſs in matters that concern religion, and their civil liberty. The total defeat of the members of our church at the late conteſt in this borough; the loſs of their power and influence, which are now threatened to devolve for the future into the hands of Diſſenters only, together with the magiſtracy, are the effects of a want of aſſiduity and care in ſupport of our neglected ſtrength. It is not ſo much the want of real reſources on our ſide, as the negligence, inattention to, and diſregard of our ſtrength and intereſt, together with our incautiouſneſs reſpecting the arts of our adverſaries, that have reduced us to this dilemma. But as nothing will avail us in future, unleſs we immediately begin, and in earneſt too, to fruſtrate their increaſing power; and as this cannot be effected without a previous due conſideration of our adverſaries, I ſhall undertake to point them out, ſet them in a proper light, and hint at ſome remedies, which though they may not be effectual to convert our adverſaries into friends, may yet prevent them from acting with ſo much force againſt

us, by removing from them in future time the means of attaining that influence, which we have ſo incautiouſly, and imprudently truſted in their hands.

We have not in this kingdom a more inveterate adverſary, than the collective body of the Diſſenters; and what is a very unfortunate circumſtance, there are ſome weak members of our own Church, who conſtantly, in party matters, very impoliticly join them. As to the Diſſenters, they are ever implacable and unanimous in their oppoſition, and rather than miſcarry in their deſigns againſt us, would be ſucceſsful even at the expence of their own civil liberties, provided they could annihilate thoſe of both at the ſame time.

It is not eaſy to give a ſatisfactory reaſon for this unaccountable behaviour, unleſs we preſume they are ſpirited to it by their teachers, whoſe intereſt it is to keep them a ſeparate body from the Church. For were there no Diſſenters, there could be no diſſenting teachers; who, by their artful management, as the caſe now ſtands, have rendered themſelves not only neceſſary, but in a great meaſure are become maſters of their conſcience; while this deluded people, under an idle notion of religious freedom and liberty, are as much the dupes and creatures of his influence, having gained this aſcendency over their minds by his artifice, as is any ſet of men ſubject to the dictates of any prieſt whatever.

Or ſhall we impute this rancour in the Diſſenters, to be the return they make to the members of the Church, whoſe hearts ever open and generous, have granted, by an act of toleration, to their meek ſpirits and tender conſciences, a full liberty of exerciſing peaceably their religion? The uſe they have made of ſuch an indulgence, eſpecially of late years, by ſpiriting up, and ſupporting diviſions among us in all party matters, and ever oppoſing us with their whole force, as a tool and engine of miniſtry, are facts too well known to the people of this kingdom, not to alarm the ſenſibility of all men, who are well-wiſhers to our civil and religious liberties; and muſt affect all ſuch who can foreſee

ſee danger, and feel for a misfortune before the blow is given. For there is no doubt, that provided a like inſenſibility which reigns here, was to prevail over the reſt of the kingdom, we ſhould ſoon ſee the national religion exploded, our conſtitutional rights and liberties deſtroyed, and a phantom ſet up, decorated with all the fantaſtic airs that crazy and hare-brained enthuſiaſm would be able to ſuggeſt.

In a word, the hiſtory of moſt countries of Europe will furniſh us with the character of theſe men; by all who have treated of them they have been marked as intollerant of any principles, whether religious or civil, which do not exactly coincide with their own. In times of reſentment, when they have ſometimes ſuffered juſtly, and at other times unjuſtly; though they have vehemently exclaimed againſt ſuch proceedings, yet, when power and the ſword were in their own hands, they knew no end, nor even medium in the wanton exerciſe of it; till either ſpent with fatigue, or defeated in their enterprize, they were compelled to deſiſt. Wherever they dare to ſhow it, they appear to have been impatient of monarchical government; and where through a want of power they dare not ſhow it, they are little better than abject ſycophants. In a late reign, as I have been informed, they ſoothed and flattered the miniſter out of an annual penſion of ſeveral thouſands a year, to be divided among their teachers, who were to connect this people to his intereſt, while he rivetted them ſtill firmer, by appointing ſome (ſuch of them I mean as could break through the barrier of the teſt act) to fill places of profit and honour under the government. They have, by theſe and the like means, been greatly increaſing ever ſince; for it is the intereſt of their teachers to enlarge their number, which is, in fact, increaſing his profit, and their power: and being thus emboldened, the ſuppoſed wiſeſt among them, ſome few years ſince clubbed their wits, and put forth a book intitled, *Candid Diſquiſitions*. The *candour* of theſe Diſquiſitions, doth evidently appear from the contents; and the modeſt propoſal they make in that dull and tedious performance, in ſubſtance is this: Like ſturdy beggars, they

they desire to be admitted into the Church, and of course the State, upon their own terms, and their teachers are to share the church benifices in common with the established clergy; for which *concession*, they propose to join their forces, with those of the clergy, in order to establish an ecclesiastical polity, or tyranny, on the necks of the laity. A yoke, I will venture to assert, no man of spirit would bear; and a slavery nearly as abject as that of Roman Catholics to their priests.

Another instance of their unquiet spirit need not, I presume, be mentioned, being so very recent and still tingling in the ears of every Englishman living; I mean the American affair in the Stamp-act. Our colonies there swarm with, or rather contain none but Dissenters; and the present inhabitants are chiefly the descendents of those who sought refuge there on the Restauration. They are heirs of the virtues of their ancestors, and I think I need say no more of them; especially when so recent an act doth evidently speak their dispositions.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER II.

NIHIL AUTEM EST AMABILIUS, NEC COPULATIUS, QUAM MORUM SIMILITUDO BONORUM. IN QUIBUS ENIM EADEM STUDIA SUNT, EADEMQUE VOLUNTAS, IN HIS FIT, UT AEQUE QUISQUE ALTERO DELECTETUR, AC SEIPSO. CICERO DE OFF.

IN my laſt paper I ſlightly touched on the character and diſpoſition of Diſſenters: I ſay ſlightly, becauſe it cannot be expected in an eſſay, ſhort as this is, that I ſhould delineate them at full length; and I mean no more than to give ſuch hints as are conducive, and immediately ſo, to my deſign. I ſhall now obſerve, that though I there truly repreſented them as intollerant of any principles, civil or religious, which coincided not with thoſe they profeſſed, yet in order to ſtrengthen their own power, and to weaken that of an adverſary, they will chearfully embrace the opportunity of aſſociating with churchmen againſt churchmen, when any party or political contention ariſes among them; and it is by this means principally, that they endanger our civil and religious liberties. Would not our divided members, weakly fly to them for ſuccour, and call in their pernicious aid, they would, in truth, be a very inſignificant people; and ſo far from having cauſe to dread them, as we now have, they might very ſafely be indulged in a toleration, which conſidered in a religious light, I would wiſh every

man might be entruſted with, who would become acquainted with its ineſtimable value, or who would make no improper uſe of it. But though from my ſoul, I wiſh every man might be indulged in a religious liberty of conſcience, yet I can by no means be induced to think, that no reſtraint becomes neceſſary, when pluming themſelves on ſuch indulgence, they take courage, and ſtrike at the civil liberties of a whole nation.

As yet, it is true, they are powerful only by our own diviſions among ourſelves; and if we would take from them the power of injuring us, this can be no way ſo well affected as by unanimity, if poſſible, and a ſteady, conſtant perſeverance in being unconnected with them in all our tranſactions. I am perfectly ſatisfied were they in our ſituation, and we in theirs, they would not place the leaſt confidence in us; they would abridge us of all power, and of whatever might have the leaſt moſt diſtant tendency to promote it. This, methinks, is evident, from their daily practice now; for you ſhall hardly find a Diſſenter in the kingdom, who will deal with a man of any perſuaſion but his own, for a ſingle article, provided he can be ſupplied with it upon as good terms by any of the Diſſenters; whereas the generality of Churchmen will trafic with them, and thoſe of their own communion indiſcriminately.

The confined notions of Diſſenters, and the generous principles of Churchmen, are as heterogeneous as the colours worn by the oppoſite parties at our late borough-election. We ſhould therefore be cautious of extending our generoſity to them, as every emolument they receive from us becomes a double increaſe of their ſtrength: as two ſcales balanced with equal weights, take a fourth part out of the one and place it in the other, the ſcale which thereby becomes deficient, will then require two fourths to balance the other. This increaſe therefore of their ſtrength, attended at the ſame time with a diminution of our own, whereby the diſparity is ſo great, becomes a very ſerious conſideration; and is methinks ſufficient to deter every well-wiſher

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to our religion and conſtitutional liberties (which I look upon as inſeparable) from laying out his money with a people, who at beſt are but very unfavourable to his principles, and who will never in return give thoſe of his perſuaſion any the like opportunities of profit and advantage; but on the contrary, will ſeize every occaſion to employ that very ſtrength in the moſt efficacious manner againſt thoſe who gave it them.

After this view of the Diſſenters, to find them oppoſing the Church is not ſo ſtriking a circumſtance. But that the Church divided into parties, ſhould call in Diſſenters to their aſſiſtance againſt their own members, is ſo impolitic a practice as ſcarcely to be thought credible. Was the kingdom divided into two parties, and ſhould the weakeſt call in to its aid an hundred thouſand French, is there a man who would not be alarmed at the project? Would not the remedy be worſe than the diſeaſe? Might we not all expect to have our throats cut, our property plundered, and poſſeſſion taken of the land? And is the project a whit more judicious, where the divided members of the Church, call in the Diſſenters to their aſſiſtance?

But if ſuch meaſures taken by the laity are altogether unaccountable, what ſhall we ſay of ſuch of our clergy, who upon theſe diviſions join with the Diſſenters, and embrace them as brethren contending in the ſame cauſe? To alledge they act thus on principle, I will be bold to ſay is not true. Men who act thus, whatever they may pretend to, can have very little principle. They are either falſe to the Diſſenters, whom they embrace as brethren, or to that Church of which they pretend to be miniſters. Thus do they diſſemble as men who would ſerve two maſters, GOD and *mammon* —— and ſo ſingular a ſpecies of hypocriſy muſt inevitably lead them to be held in the meaneſt contempt, by every virtuous and honeſt man of every perſuaſion under the ſun.

To betray that Church of which they are, or pretend to be, the paſtors, into the hands of its avowed adverſary, is *ſomewhat* too atrocious

cious to inſiſt on; and that the Diſſenters are the great adverſaries of the Church of England, I believe no man in his ſober ſenſes ever doubted. I much queſtion, whether there are ten Diſſenters in the three kingdoms, who would not degrade every biſhop we have, ſtrip them of every thing, lay our cathedrals in ruin, convert every Church into barns and offices, and turn every miniſter of the Church adriſt, who could not comply with their nonſenſe and enthuſiaſm. Theſe men have been greatly ſupported by the miniſtry, in preference to others; which has increaſed their numbers, and emboldened them as we daily ſee: But I am much miſtaken if in the end, it will not have work enough upon its hands to ſupport itſelf againſt *them*. Are theſe the men we ſhould join ourſelves to? Can we ſafely aſſociate with men of theſe principles? That we cannot ſafely, is a truth I would infuſe into the minds of Churchmen, that we may no longer be the dupes of their artifice, nor deceived or impoſed on by any two-faced Janus's.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER III.

— — — — — — — ASPICE SI QUID
ET NOS, QUOD CURES PROPRIUM FECISSE, LOQUAMUR. HOR.

MEN of real independency, who act only on principles of virtue and honor in ſupport of their liberties, the conſtitution, and the welfare and proſperity of their country, though they undoubtedly act from the nobleſt motives that can inſpire the human breaſt, yet I fear it will be found they have undertaken an arduous taſk; a taſk they can never get through with, or if ſucceſsful, it can only be accompliſhed at the expence and labor of ſtruggling through an infinity almoſt of difficulties. They have every thing to contend with that can throw danger, hazard, and difficulty in their way. The ſpirit of the age, the manners of the people, and the adopted plan of politics which ſeems calculated to avail itſelf of the licentiouſneſs and corruption of the times, rather than to ſuppreſs them, afford us altogether but a gloomy proſpect on the future; and muſt ſtrike every conſiderate man with a lively image of the Roman Empire when paſt the meridian of its glory, at the time it received thoſe firſt ſhocks, the fatal ſymptoms of its future diſſolution: which all the abilities, virtues, honor, and intrepidity of ſome few of its members, though united together in ſo honorable a cauſe, and exerting all their efforts, attempted to prevent, but in vain. What followed under the reigns of the ſucceeding Emperors, but more particularly ſome of them, preſented to the ſenſes of mankind ſuch inexpreſſible ſcenes of horror, that the moſt intrepid

among us muſt ſhudder at the bare recital, and be ſtruck with aſtoniſhment to ſee the deſcendants of the braveſt and wiſeſt people become puſillanimous tyrants and ſlaves; diveſting themſelves of human nature to deſcend into cruelties and vices till then unknown; and greedily ruſhing into every guilt and crime that could have been ſuggeſted by the moſt active minds expreſsly tutored in every kind of corruption and unexampled villainy.

May heaven avert the like ills from my native country! but where are we taught merely to pray, and not concur with our beſt endeavours to obtain that help we pray for? The manners of the times lead to deſtruction. The general corruption which prevails among us; the univerſal luxury; the contempt of the violation of oaths, good faith, and honor; the flagrant adulteries; the diſſolution ſo common of marriages; the deſire of amaſſing wealth by unwarrantable means; the ſupporting of ambition in indolence to the enervating of induſtry and merit; and the general contempt of the duties we owe to our country; with a thouſand more enormous ills which might eaſily be enumerated by any one the leaſt inclined to enlarge the black catalogue, are ſtrong preſumptions, and ſpeak loudly, without a ſpeedy reformation we are a people devoted to ruin.

This corruption of morals has affected our political principles. Men think no longer of their country and liberty. The love of theſe is ſwallowed up by ambition or annihilated in the love of money, which is to ſupport luxury and debauchery: and by lucrative emoluments, men are ſwayed from their natural principles of honor and patriotiſm, to ſupport unnatural ſentiments and actions, and every deſtructive meaſure that may be propoſed to them. Few are ſo ingenuous as to think how they ought to act; the queſtion is, who bids me act: and the conſideration, what immediate advantage I ſhall draw to myſelf for complying, even though contrary to all rectitude, and conſcience. How many in this kingdom, in affairs of the utmoſt importance to the welfare of our country and the conſtitution, are governed by conſiderations like theſe? And I fear would go much farther, were they prompted to it

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by the influence that directs them. Men are to be found among us, and I fear they are many in number who act from no other motive than fee and reward: who are ready to execute the most desperate deeds as soon as the nod of power shall give its assent to the perpetration. So long as this is the case, it must be confessed, our liberties and the constitution stand on very uncertain foundations; and were the signal once given, they would be torn away and crushed into atoms immediately.

One of the most envied rights of a free people under a constitution like ours, is to have a free election of members to represent them in parliament; and that their representatives be free likewise is of the utmost importance to the whole state. If our liberties and the constitution can be supposed of any duration, their firmness and stability must be derived from these materials. But let any impartial eye behold our elections; and in spight of all prepossession and prejudice he must acknowledge, that the rights of the people are grosly violated, while ministerial influence pours in its devoted numbers, without any wills of their own; collected with the utmost industry from all corners of the kingdom, to vote as they are commanded on pain of being cashiered, or (what may be as fatal in their situation) giving offence to their superiors; to the almost total suppression in many places, of the free voices of a free people. Thus by the swarming forth of these creatures and tools of power, together with all the tribe of dependants and expectants, we are in a great measure deprived of one of our most inestimable privileges; and our elections in many instances become as arbitrary under ministerial influence (the parade only excepted to save appearances) as they could be, for ought I know to the contrary, under any form of government whatever.

A remedy to this might be devised, and which I may perhaps, be induced to speak to hereafter. For the present I shall only hint, that men who mean well, and to support our liberties and the constitution, should begin with being particularly careful of not being engaged in the gross vices, the luxury and corruption of the times. One excess leads to another, and penury and poverty must close the scene, unless these

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wants can be ſupplied from new reſources. This lays them open to an opportunity, or rather is an inducement to ſacrifice public weal to private emolument: then honor and reputation fall a prey to luxury; independency to ſlavery; and the fearful end is reproach, infamy and ignominy. Reproach, as acting evidently contrary, and in oppoſition to the dictates of heart and conſcience; infamy and ignominy, as doing ſo in the face of all men, and for pecuniary advantages, to ſupply wants created by exceſs.

A ſtate of ſervile dependence, wherein thoſe actions which do moſt honor to man in a civil capacity, are circumſcribed, reſtrained, or directed to take a different courſe at the will of another, is certainly the moſt abject ſtate that a man can be reduced to. To deſcend lower he muſt paſs even the verge of ſociety, become priſoner both in body and mind, and have neither act nor will of his own. But the former is a condition ſufficiently deplorable! to avoid which, were it not preferable to live within the bounds of reaſon and temperance, and to endeavour by a frugal induſtry, to obtain ſuch things as are neceſſary, than to depend on the will of another, and be ſupported in indolence from the ſpoils of a diſtreſſed and languiſhing country? An honeſt and induſtrious poverty is a diſgrace to no one; but to be fed and glutted with the bleeding vitals of our country, is an infamy and eternal reproach to any man.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER IV.

OMNIA ENIM PROFECTO SUNT LAUDANDA, QUAE CONJUNCTA CUM VIRTUTE SUNT: ET QUAE CUM VITIIS, VITUPERANDA.

CICERO.

I FIND the Diſſenters are nettled, and that I am got where I expected to be, in a hornet's neſt. They are buzzing about, and I hear in private converſations they abuſe me, becauſe I have not abuſed them; and impute falſhood to me, as though I had ſaid, they were ever abettors of truth. This, may be termed anticipation; and I well perceive by it where they would be. Yet though they load me with unmerited abuſe, I will never charge them with any thing they are not guilty of; for then I ſhould become like unto them, which it ſhall be my conſtant endeavour to avoid. With their leave, however, I ſhall ſet them right in one particular: which is, that if they are offended, it cannot with any propriety be at me, but at the truths I have advanced; and therefore I can only afford them this comfort in their diſtreſs, that ſo long as they continue in the ſame mind, they are likely to be offended as long as I live.

I wiſh however, for I know my intereſt with them is not great, that they would reſtrain themſelves from corrupting with their prejudices the miniſters of our Church; ſome of whom ſeem to be ſo intimately connected with them in party and principles, that it hath been matter of doubt to many, whether or not they are miniſters of the Church, or Diſſenters in diſguiſe. They certainly have an *intereſt* in thus con-

cealing themſelves; but would it not be altogether as candid and ingenuous to act in a manner conſiſtent with their functions, as to put it in doubt both by their words and actions, what manner of men they are? To ſee them conſtantly join the Diſſenters in party matters, always, and in all places ſpeaking favorably of their cauſe whatever it be; and to hear them on the Sunday following reading prayers, and preaching in the Church, are tokens of ſo motley a character, that their pariſhoners may fairly be allowed to doubt of their principles in religion, or whether indeed they have any religion or principles at all. Did the miniſter of my pariſh fall under the like predicament, I ſhould make no ſcruple, (and I hope too without offence) to queſtion him on this intereſting point, were it only for the ſake of the conſciences of his pariſhoners, whoſe minds became liable to be deluded by ſuch an example. And did he perform divine ſervice in a pariſh were contributions were raiſed for him, I ſhould chuſe to withdraw my ſubſcription, till ſuch time as he ſhould act conſiſtently with his character, and I was ſatisfied he had *reformed* to the Church.

I muſt further beg leave to aſſure them, this putting on, and wearing two faces, ſits but awkwardly upon them; as in this, at beſt, they but mimic their architype, the Diſſenters; with whom, if I may be allowed the expreſſion in its literal ſenſe it is *decent*, becauſe there it is both characteriſtic and natural. It is, with their leave, what we ſhall always expect to ſee them accompanied with, and I truſt they will rarely diſappoint us. But in our clergy, as it is unnatural, ſo is it ridiculous; and to wear the coat of a buffoon and merry andrew, would not be acting more inconſiſtently.

What a difference and diſtinction in tenets and principles, between the members of the Eſtabliſhed Church, and the Diſſenters! Would you figure to yourſelf this difference on a compariſon with other things, it will be found to be as great as the two kinds of edifices in which they perform worſhip; they are altogether as unlike as a Church, and a Conventicle. Were there not a wide and impervious chaſm lying between, and ſeparating the two opinions, the Diſſenters would be inexcuſable

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in not putting away their hereſy, coming over, and cloſing with the Church. This they ought to do, provided it could be done with a ſafe conſcience, were it only becauſe the Church is by much the more numerous body; its members, as learned at leaſt, as the Diſſenters; and laſtly becauſe it is the national religion and eſtabliſhed BY-LAW, which all pious men, (as theſe affect to be) ſhould endeavour to comply with. Hence the Diſſenters, if they would be thought to act from reaſon and conſcience, and not from perverſeneſs and obſtinacy, muſt be ſuppoſed to ſee ſo ſtrong a barrier between the two as to render the coalition utterly impracticable: There muſt be ſo wide a diſtinction in the two perſuaſions, and their notions ſo repugnant to each other, as to prevent the two parties from ever uniting. If this be ſo, I would aſk, how ſo many of their members manage the point, when they attend the ſervice of the Church, and even receive the ſacrament at the hands of its miniſters, to qualify themſelves for magiſtracies, and other offices of truſt, honor, and profit under the government, to the excluſion of Churchmen, who might in this reſpect be thought better qualified? If in their judgment it be unwarrantable for them to join the Church in its ſervice and ſacrament, when it is not to qualify them for places and offices; can it become warrantable ſo to do, when ſuch places and offices are the objects which induce them? If they can at any time comply with the rights and ceremonies of the Church; why not at all times? But if they do ſo on time-ſerving occaſions only, muſt they not be thought to prevaricate abominably with GOD and man! and to be very *Jeſuits* in the arts of diſſimulation?

In this, they are certainly more culpable than the Jeſuits themſelves, and all of the Roman Catholic perſuaſion. It is indeed the weakneſs, and misfortune of the latter, to imagine that on ſimilar occaſions they can have a ſatisfactory abſolution from their prieſts; and vainly perſuaded as they are into this error, they ſeem culpable only through an infatuation and ignorance. A fatal infatuation indeed! yet are they in this caſe leſs offenſive than the Diſſenters, who thus knowingly diſſemble in oppoſition to the plain dictates of conſcience; in doing which, their tenets ſupply them with no emollients whatever; and who will

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ſtill perſevere, at all riſks, though fully conſcious of the atrociouſneſs of the offence.

Theſe are the *ſaints* who pretend to *more* purity than *all* other religious ſocieties. Were they *as pure* as *any* other, I would never quarrel with them about their *ſaint-ſhip*. But the garb of religion, let me tell them, is too ſtale a trick to impoſe on any at this time, not excepted even the illiterate and vulgar; and a man muſt be ſtupid and illiterate indeed, who ſees not under all their ſheeps-cloathing, the fierce ſpirit of hungry wolves that ſeek to devour us.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER V.

— — — — UTINAMQUE OCULOS IN PECTORA POSSES
INSERERE, ET PATRIAS INTUS DEPRENDERE CURAS.

OVID. MET.

I HAVE neither leiſure, nor inclination to anſwer reports which are the ſuggeſtions of malice, and devoid of all truth. Nor yet to ſatisfy the idle curioſity of men who are led to look into things merely from their novelty, who without intending to examine the truths propoſed, or weighing the reaſons alledged to form their judgments in conſequence thereof, continue in the ſame inſenſible ſtate of indifference in which we found them. But there are others who in their hearts mean well, though they have been greatly impoſed on by the artful inſinuations of men of the former claſs; from whom they have been ſupplied with ſtrange ideas of men and things; ideas, as diſſimilar from the true and juſt, as they are derogatory to the perſons and things they mean to repreſent by them. To inform the minds of men ſo deluded in ſome material particulars, and reſcue their innocence and the uprightneſs of their diſpoſitions from falling a prey in future time to the machinations of theſe induſtrious deluders, ſhall be the ſubject of my preſent paper. And I truſt there is hardly any one of my cavillers ſo loſt to the feelings of humanity, as not to pay ſome ſmall tribute of acknowledgment to the merit ariſing from ſetting a weak brother right in his opinion, and eraſing from his mind falſe and pernicious ideas, in order to ſubſtitute ſuch in their ſtead as are true, equitable and rational; from whence ſome rays of light may ſhine forth to direct his actions in a matter of no inconſiderable moment.

In a land of liberty there are few individuals who are not of conſequence in the ſtate, either by their voice or influence, as the well being

and converſation of their liberties depend on their joint voices. If the more illiterate therefore among theſe are miſled, the conſequences may be fatal. Yet men have not been wanting, who either through ignorance, malice, or ſome other motive have taken great pains to propagate falſhoods and ſcandal againſt the character and principles of a numerous body of men, making I preſume, at leaſt one half of this kingdom both in number and property. The perſons ſo ill-treated, are known in this part of the kingdom by the name of TRUE BLUES, as chuſing to diſtinguiſh themſelves in party conteſts by ribbands of that color. As colors in general are made uſe of on theſe occaſions as the diſtinguiſhing marks of party, it may be granted, without partiality, they have as good a right to chuſe theirs, as any other party to make choice of any other; and therefore, that the inveteracy of other parties againſt them, cannot be ſuppoſed to proceed from the colors they wear, but from the principles truly or falſely imagined to be entertained by them who on theſe occaſions wear that color. To ſet the miſguided and ignorant right in this point, I ſhall here ſubjoin the general principles of a TRUE BLUE; in doing which, it ſhall be my principal endeavor as a man of honor, to adhere ſtrictly to truth, without any equivocation, or mental reſervation whatſoever.

PRINCIPLES of a TRUE BLUE, religious and political.

The religious principles of a TRUE BLUE are conformable to the doctrines of the CHURCH OF ENGLAND as BY LAW eſtabliſhed. They look upon the religious precepts, tenets, doctrine and worſhip of the Church of England, taken all together, to be the moſt conſonant to HOLY SCRIPTURE, and conſequently the moſt complete and perfect, of any at this day profeſſed in the world. They conceive the Religion of the Church of England to be the happy medium between the idolatry, ſuperſtition, and other religious extravagancies of the Roman Church on the one hand; and the pretended purity, innovations, and enthuſiaſm of Diſſenters on the other. And its members are unqueſtionably entitled to a merit which Diſſenters cannot pretend to, in that they not only comply, but heartily concur in the doctrine and worſhip of that church which is eſtabliſhed BY LAW: while Diſſenters by not acquieſcing therein, and ſtrenuouſly oppoſing it, do certainly breed ſchiſms in religious matters, which are frequently productive of civil diſcord, to the endangering both Church and Conſtitution, as the hiſtory of moſt countries doth evince. Conſequently they cannot be eſteemed equally

good

good ſubjects with the members of the eſtabliſhed Church, of which, all TRUE BLUES do profeſs themſelves to be members.

The political principles of a TRUE BLUE are theſe: They do deteſt and abhor an abſolute arbitrary Power, whether in the PRINCE, or the miniſter. They are the faſt friends of a LIMITED MONARCHY, being ſuch as by the Conſtitution ought of right to be eſtabliſhed in this kingdom. They are therefore firm friends of his preſent Majeſty KING GEORGE THE THIRD and his Government, whom they wiſh long to reign over them in all the proſperity of a KING ruling in the hearts of his ſubjects, a free people. As enemies of abſolute power, they approve of no meaſures whereby the prerogative of the Crown ſhall invade the rights of the people. As friends of a limited Monarchy, they oppoſe all acts whereby the ſubject may invade or intrude on the prerogative of the Crown: being ſenſible that if the power of either ſhall encroach on the rights of the other, and perſiſt therein, there muſt ſoon be an end of the conſtitution. As in the one caſe, an abſolute government muſt take place; and in the other, a republican government or common-wealth: both which they are averſe to.

That therefore, they do profeſs that the executive power of this kingdom doth of right appertain unto the KING ſolely. That the Legiſlative Power doth reſide in KING, LORDS, and COMMONS jointly. That the LORDS and COMMON PEOPLE of this kingdom are a free people. That the people have an undoubted right to chuſe their members which are to repreſent them in Parliament. That the choice and election thereof ought to be free. That all court or miniſterial influence in ſuch caſes is unconſtitutional. That any miniſter, or other perſon by virtue of any place or office under the government, uſing ſuch influence in elections to bias the minds of the electors, is an enemy to this Conſtitution, thereby wounding it in its moſt tender part, by depriving the people of their rights, and violating their liberties in the moſt eſſential point, namely, in the FREE election of their members to repreſent them in Parliament; which is the foundation or rather eſſence of all their rights and liberties whatſoever.

Theſe are the heads of the religious and political principles of a TRUE BLUE, and whoever doth not avow theſe principles is not a TRUE BLUE, nor hath he any right to rank himſelf among that number.

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As to the principles of their opponents, I do verily think, little can be ſaid in their behalf; and I fear they ſtand in need of a better juſtification than I am able to make for them, or than they can deviſe for themſelves. However this may be, certain it is they are not of one opinion among themſelves either in religion or politics. And it is the misfortune of the Church of England, to have Diſſenters of all denominations, as well as Deiſts and Atheiſts in a league againſt it. Yet thus *occaſionally* joined, they differ not more in their religious, than in their political principles. And with good reaſon; one ſet among them acting merely from ambition: the motives to another ſet are places, offices, employments, penſions, fine-cures, benefices, &c. &c.; the inducement to a third, may be religion, as in the caſe of the Diſſenters; this leads them to oppoſe us in party or political matters; for no doubt were they able, they would eſtabliſh their religion on the ruins of the Church; this can be no way effected without putting things firſt into confuſion; and to do this they muſt buſy themſelves in party and politics, as they are ſeen to do at this day, with no ſmall vehemence. So that theſe people with all their connexions are upon every occaſion ready to be drawn up againſt us; and make a formidable body for one ſet of men only (who act merely on principle, and to ſupport the conſtitution in church and ſtate) to encounter with.

A few there are moreover, and I fear but few, who oppoſe us from principle, ariſing either from prejudice of education, miſrepreſentation concerning our principles, or an unwillingneſs to make enquiry into the matter. I could wiſh theſe men would examine us thoroughly; for I am perſuaded the more they did ſo, with coolneſs and impartiality, (which might be expected from them, though not from the others) the cloſer they would be connected with us. And on our part we ſhould be ready to receive them as friends, and rejoice in ſo deſirable an acquiſition.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER VI.

— — — AT MALÈ CONCEPTUS CREVERAT INFANS;
QUAEREBATQUE VIAM. — — — — —
OVID. MET.

WE have already been witneſs to what the Diſſenters can do, when joined by a party of the Church againſt the chief body of it. And it is to be *hoped* this party which joined them, will ſtill perſevere in the ſame ſentiments, and preſerve againſt a *future day* the like *prudential* conduct; that ſo, the houſe may continue to be divided againſt itſelf, by which means it muſt fall, if there be any truth in Divine Revelation.

Thoſe perſons who joined themſelves to the Diſſenters are highly to be commended; and were I maſter of language and eloquence equal to ſuch an undertaking, I would not delay for one moment that *encomium* they ſo juſtly deſerve: But *virtue* like *theirs* is frequently left to be its own reward, and therefore I will leave it to that reward it merits. They will give me leave however to *hope* for their ſteady and conſtant perſeverance in the road that has been chalked out to them, to which if they adhere with more fidelity than they have to that Church of which they would be ſuppoſed members, we may expect to ſee on the 8th of September next, two Diſſenters elected Bailiffs; who, I am informed, are preparing themſelves for the office by an aſſiduous attendance on the ſervice of our Church; in order to remove, *if it were poſſible*, thoſe diſagreeable reflections on chuſing men into that office who are not of the eſtabliſhed religion. If there are any among us ſo weak as to be caught by ſuch external appearances, and thence led to believe that a converſion has been wrought upon them; I cannot but pity their credulity. For my part, I would as ſoon believe that a miracle was wrought *by them*, as *upon them*; and ſhould look upon that as little leſs than a miracle, which ſhould induce them to alter their forms and their creeds. No; the conſummate knowledge which theſe men poſſeſs, was too deep laid in the foundation, and too highly finiſhed in the ſuperſtructure, to have it ever imagined, it ſhould be converted to ſuch mean purpoſes, and fall to a level in religious matters with the general ſenſe of the nation; and the *pompoſity* they have lately acquired by a very *extraordinary event*, has made them conſider *themſelves* rather as objects of adoration, than put them upon thinking ſeriouſly of any other kind of *worſhip*—ſave *that* annexed to the Magiſtracy.

As it is required of all men to be obedient unto Magiſtrates, without which neither Law nor Goſpel are complied with; and as I make no queſtion but theſe

gentlemen are to be Magiſtrates on the eighth of September next, I ſhall be glad to be previouſly informed what mode of religion their Worſhips will be pleaſed to have eſtabliſhed throughout their juriſdiction. Whether, or not, they will vouchſafe to grant a *toleration* to the Members of the Church of England, that they may peaceably enjoy their Religion; or whether we are all to burn our Prayer-Books, and attend the Conventicle. If we are to attend the Conventicle, which of the two Conventicles? For I have been aſſured, the members of the one, have a moſt confirmed antipathy to thoſe of the other; and would be ſoon ſharpening their knives to cut each others throats, was there not the Church of England in the way——to be diſpatched firſt. And then we ſhould ſee religious zeal hacking its way through all fainter oppoſitions, to anarchy, and *confuſion worſe confounded.*

As regularity and order are abſolutely neceſſary for the ſupport of every ſociety, I hope theſe great men, their future *worſhips*, will be graciouſly pleaſed in due time to inform us what their wills and pleaſures are, concerning our future religious worſhip; and will ſettle the article of the Conventicle: that, it being publicly known which of the two we are to attend, we may previouſly apply to them for ſome old veteran to give us the diſcipline of the forms, when we worſhip in the Houſe of *Rimmon*. This becomes the more neceſſary, as they have no books whereby the novice may be inſtructed; their forms being ſo different from thoſe of the Church of England; and their conceits in religious matters ſo odd and quaint, that it would be impoſſible for a Churchman by his plain ſimple wit ever to deviſe what *they* were engaged in, who can conceive prayer made in public for a numerous congregation, to be of ſo little moment, and the Divine Preſence ſo familiar to them, that they conſtantly addreſs themſelves to it by *extempore* effuſions, the ſudden ſuggeſtions of an agitated mind: Yet, when they addreſs an earthly Prince, it is by a conned and ſtudied performance, worked up with all the art of laboured language, the hard production of their aching noddles. Nor can Churchmen who are to join with them know when they are about the more ſolemn acts of religion; ſince the poſtures into which they put themſelves on ſuch occaſions do not expreſs it. For men who make a point of receiving the ſacrament on their poſteriors; when they pray, may think it convenient to lie all along. To kneel, when they ſing pſalms. And to receive the doctrines and precepts of a ſermon, ſleeping; that ſo, inſtead of ſinking deep into the mind and heart, they may aſſimilate with the airy and fantaſtic viſions of their dreams; become the pageants of a moment; fly off fuliginous vapours; evaporate into air; and tranſmeate back again into thoſe regions of the moon, whence they derived their original: which planet, by this means becomes an inexhauſtible fund and ſource, wherewith to ſupply the moon-ſtruck wants of their ineffable teachers.

Theſe conſiderations put us upon hoping that we may be allowed ſome old diſciplined guide and inſtructor in their ceremonies; that by our aukwardneſs we may not diſcompoſe the congregation, nor be deficient in a decency ſo neceſſary on ſuch occaſions. But there is ſtill an almoſt inſuperable difficulty occurs. We ſhall be ſo many in number, that neither of the Conventicles will be large enough to contain one twentieth part of us. What is to be done? My project is this: that as to each of the Conventicles there is a large area in front; the conventicle ſhall be ſhut up till ſuch time as the people are *weaned* from the eſtabliſhed religion; and the Teacher ſhall inſtruct us in the area, as many at a time as may be convenient without being crouded, and ſo take all in rotation as faſt as we can be admitted. As to the Teacher, as the harveſt is great, he muſt be content to work *extra* hours, or to have a journeyman, or two, which ever ſhall be moſt approved of. There ſtill remains one obſtacle; which is the Teacher's preaching in the open air, expoſed on every ſide to wind and weather, which may endan-

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ger his voice. And as they are much ſubject to over-heat themſelves in their diſcourſe, he will *ſub dio*, *dum trepedis agat in rebus*, be the more liable to take cold, become hoarſe, loſe his voice; and we the way to Heaven. To prevent which fatal diſaſter, a very ingenious friend of mine promiſed me ſome time ſince, to contrive a machine *on a new principle* for this ſole uſe. I well know that arch wag SWIFT would have put him into a tub; but I have two objections to *tubbing* him: One is, that he would be ſtill expoſed over head; the other is, the ſmell of the liquor, which is very apt to affect weak brains. I ſhall therefore communicate that ingenious device which my friend has favoured me with. Leſs need be ſaid in its praiſe, as I am ſatisfied it will be found on examination to anſwer all the ends and purpoſes propoſed, which is the caſe with very few pieces of mechaniſm; and what further enhances its value, it is ſo ſimple, ſo plain, and ſo free from all complication, as clearly evinces it to have been the invention of a great genius, ſtruck out at a ſingle thought; ſome of which have been held in greater eſteem through ſucceeding ages, than the laboured productions of meaner geniuſſes, though their whole lives have been employed about them. Having paid this juſt tribute to the genius of my friend, and ſpoken of his machine with part of that elogy it merits; I ſhall proceed to deſcribe it, and afterwards treat of its ſingular advantages.

This machine is to be the ſame in form and ſize with the chimney and cowl of a malting-office, taken off at about five feet below the cowl. The cowl is not to be moveable and go round like other cowls, but to be fixed to the *chimney* (which we now call the *body* of the machine) which is to hold the body of the Teacher. There is to be taken off from the bottom of the body of the machine the ſpace of one foot and an half, the upper part of which is to be boarded, and forms a floor for the Teacher to ſtand on; the ſpace from that floor to the bottom of the machine, which is one foot and an half, is to be a box, which is to receive a ſpindle in the centre (as in wind-mills) which is to ſupport it, and on which the whole machine, cowl, and all is to turn by means of ſwivels and wheels which are to play in the box. The other end of the ſpindle is to be fixed ſecurely in the ground, ornamented with a pedeſtal, and may be made by the help of a ſcrew in the middle to lower or raiſe him and the machine for the benefit of the wind. The Teacher will thus have three feet and an half depth of the machine to encircle him; and above he will be covered with the cowl gradually riſing up and bending forward over him. The board which runs out from the cowl and by which the wind turns it, is in our machine to be placed over the Teacher's head, that being higher the wind may have more power on it, which is the more neceſſary, as in our caſe the wind is to turn the whole machine. At the back of the machine is to be a moveable ladder to recline on the bottom edge of the machine, by which the Teacher is to aſcend; and at the ſummit of the ladder is to be a door in the machine by which he is to enter.

The great advantages of this machine, are theſe: firſt, the cowl ſecures his head and neck from all weather; and is at the ſame time an excellent ſounding-board: the body of the machine incaſes his body at the ſame time. As the body and cowl turn with every breeze, he will have always the wind and weather at the back of the machine; which will not only ſecure him from all bad weather, but will greatly facilitate his delivery. Another conſiderable advantage of this machine, and entirely owing to the eaſe with which it turns at every breeze is, that it will ſave the Teacher the trouble of running from one ſide to the other, as they are frequently obſerved to do with no ſmall agitation of body and mind. Here then, he may reſt compoſed, and leave all that trouble to the winds. For as nothing is ſo uncertain as the wind even to a proverb, he will be whiffed firſt on one ſide, then back again to the other, and a ſtrong gale whirls him clear round; ſo that all his audience muſt, at times, partake of his diſcourſe; and without partiality,

tiality, as it is left to the winds to determine it: thus upon the whole he will have ſuch advantages as no Orator before him ever had. There is nothing againſt him but a dead calm, which fortunately, ſeldom happens in this iſland; and even in that caſe, he is but reduced to a par with all other orators of the pulpit. But my ingenious friend, whoſe talents almoſt exceed credibility, does not leave him here—the cowl, though faſtened, is made to take off occaſionally; and then he may run round and deliver his eloquence from any quarter of the machine he pleaſes. Happy Orator! Happy Audience! when ſhall we be of the number of the latter?

This Print of the MACHINE on the NEW PRINCIPLE
Is dedicated to the Diſſenting Teachers of all denominations,
The pretended Reformers of the Church of England.



Engraved by Conventicle Kirk, under the inſpection of twelve Elders.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE *Clergy* of the Church of England, Freemen of this Borough, *in the intereſt of the Diſſenters*, are earneſtly requeſted not to abſent themſelves on the 8th of September next enſuing; as two rigid Diſſenters then purpoſe to contend, in oppoſition to Churchmen, for the Bailiff-ſhip of this Borough; and therefore, hope for their votes and intereſt; and the ſtrenuous ſupport of all other the Clergy, favourable to their cauſe, on this intereſting occaſion. Which ſervice will be *grateſully acknowledged*, whenever the religion of the Preſbyterians ſhall become triumphant over the Church of England.

The Diſſenters hope to be excuſed a perſonal application, as they are very deeply engaged in concerting this ſcheme. But have ordered their *Teachers* to wait on ſuch *Clergymen*, to compliment them on their behalf; and to communicate to them what progreſs they have made in a project for the total extirpation of the Church, which, they make no doubt will meet with their entire approbation and concurrence.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER VII.

IIS DE REBUS AGIMUS, QUAE SUNT ETIAM NEGOTIIS ANTEPONENDAE.

CIC. DE NAT. DEOR.

I HAVE frequently obſerved, not without emotion, that your placemen, penſioners, and all the tribe of miniſterial dependants and expectants, when a political ſubject is ſtarted, immediately ſtop our mouths by repreſenting what inadequate judges we muſt be of ſuch a ſubject; as though men were utterly incapable of forming any judgment of what ſo immediately concerns them, and upon which their well-being in ſociety principally depends! I will not be anſwerable for the want of knowledge in ſome men; nor yet for the refined artifice of others. But this I will venture to aſſert, it is prudent in *them* to obviate ſuch a diſcourſe, becauſe many things would naturally ariſe in a ſubject of that nature, handled by men of independence, and warm with the love of their country and our envied conſtitution, which would be apt to make ſuch of them bluſh as had any feelings left; and ſuch as had not, could hardly fail being offended at the bold truths which would unavoidably eſcape from the mouth of an advocate zealous for the true intereſts of his country.

My intent however at preſent, is not to dive further into this ſubject, but to endeavor to remove that obſtacle they perpetually throw in our way, I mean that notion they are pleaſed to entertain of our ignorance; by which they reflect not only on our capacity and literature, as gentlemen; but on our privileges as Engliſhmen. In an Engliſhman, what can be more laudable than to ſpeak of his Liberties, *while yet he enjoys them?* It is an indication of his gratitude for them, of the love he bears them, and of the value at which he rates them; which will naturally lead him to be ſuch a ſubject as will endeavor to avoid the commiſſion of every action by which he might forfeit, or endanger them. And

well may ſuch an idea be conceived of them! The political Liberties of an Engliſhman are ſo great, that no ſubjects under Heaven do enjoy the like with themſelves; (but withal, let me obſerve, attended with this ſingular circumſtance, there is no medium for us as with other nations, for our Liberties once loſt, we muſt inevitably ſink into the moſt abject ſlavery.) The Conſtitution of England is in its nature ſo excellent, that the beſt writers among the moderns have been laviſh in their praiſes of it, and ſome even to envy. It was not all the wiſdom of the ancients, great as it was, and ſo much as the deepeſt among them devoted their ſtudies to civil policy either in Greece or Italy, that could form a model of civil government any ways equal to it. And I truſt when this is deſtroyed, our poſterity will never enjoy ſuch another.

To ſtifle therefore the clamors of ſuch as would ſilence us; to render the knowledge of theſe our moſt invaluable enjoyments more extenſive; and to enable the more unlettered part of my countrymen, not only to *think* but even to *ſpeak* with ſome tolerable propriety and preciſion on ſo intereſting a ſubject, a ſubject ſo graceful in the mouth of every Engliſhman; I ſhall ſubjoin from no leſs an author than Monteſquieu, an extract of the Engliſh Conſtitution, which he has ſketched in ſo conciſe, nervous, and yet ſo full, ſo ſatisfactory, and ſo maſterly a manner, that I know not the like is to be found in any other Author whatſoever.

But previous to my laying this before my Readers I have ſomewhat to premiſe, wherein I could wiſh to have been excuſed if the nature of the thing would have permitted it; nothing being ſo irkſome at any time, but eſpecially in public, as to ſpeak of one's ſelf. The preſent circumſtance however requires I ſhould do ſo; the Reader therefore will pleaſe to be informed without further apology, that the following tranſlation is my own, and never before made its appearance in public. I mention this, not that I would have it imagined that I think myſelf more capable than others, nor even ſo capable as moſt of a drudgery, which I ſhould envy no man who excelled in; but the truth is, I have no tranſlation of this Author by me, nor had I ever the curioſity to look into one. The fidelity however which I have propoſed to myſelf in this tranſlation, together with a remark or two which I have occaſionally thrown in as tending towards an illuſtration, will render it, I hope, not altogether unacceptable. But I have a further ſatisfaction from having made this open declaration; for I put ſuch of my adverſaries upon their guard as could ſuſpect I would impoſe on them in this matter. And indeed there are thoſe among them who would have ſomewhat to juſtify them in ſuch a ſurmize, if they would be at the

trouble

trouble to examine their own conduct; for they would find their actions to be ſo diametrically oppoſite to the principles of liberty and the conſtitution here laid before them, and ſo directly tending to the annihilation of both, that they might well conceive the analyſis here given was ſomewhat feigned in theory only, to be placed in contradiſtinction to their rule of action. They will therefore, I hope, examine it attentively, which may induce them to entertain a more favorable opinion of *me* whatever they do of *themſelves*; and whom I would not yet deſpair of, could they be once prevailed on to make uſe of their reaſon to ſecond their own *true* intereſts, to the diſcarding of their prejudices, with every mean and ſelfiſh conſideration; thoſe chains that bind them to ſlavery, and ſet them upon forging others for the reſt of their countrymen.

Extract from MONTESQUIEU'S SPIRIT of LAWS, B. 11. chap. 6. vol. I. p. 219.

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND.

'There are three kinds of powers in every ſtate; the legiſlative power, the executive power of thoſe things which concern the law of nations, and the executive power of thoſe which concern the civil laws of the community.'

'By virtue of the firſt, the prince or magiſtrate makes laws for a certain time or for ever, and corrects or repeals thoſe already made. By virtue of the ſecond he declares War or makes Peace, ſends or receives embaſſies, provides for ſafety, prevents invaſions. By the third he puniſhes crimes, or ſits judge on the diſputes of individuals. The latter may be called the power of judging, and the other ſimply the executive power of the ſtate.'

'Political liberty in a citizen is that ſatisfaction of mind ariſing from a confidence each man has of his ſafety; and to enjoy this liberty, the government muſt be ſuch that one citizen may ſtand in no fear of another.'

'Whenever the legiſlative and executive powers are veſted in one and the ſame perſon or in one body of magiſtracy, there is no liberty; becauſe it may be apprehended that the ſame monarch or ſame ſenate may enact tyrannical laws to execute them tyrannically.'

'Neither is there any liberty, if the power of judging be not ſeparate from the legiſlative and executive powers. If joined to the legiſlative power, then the power on the life and liberty of the citizen would be arbitrary; for the judge would be lawgiver. If joined to the executive, the judge would have the power of an oppreſſor.'

'All

'All would be deſtroyed if the ſame perſon, or the ſame body of chiefs, or of nobles, or of the people, did exerciſe theſe three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public determinations, and that of judging of the crimes or diſputes of individuals.'

'In moſt kingdoms of Europe the government is ſoftened, becauſe the prince in poſſeſſion of the two firſt powers, relinquiſhes the third to his ſubjects. In Turkey where theſe three powers are united in the Sultan, a horrid deſpotiſm prevails.'

'In the Republics of Italy where theſe three powers are united, there is leſs liberty than in our monarchies. And the government in order to ſupport itſelf, is conſtrained to adopt as violent meaſures as the Turkiſh government; witneſs the State Inquiſitors at Venice, and the box wherein every informer may at any time throw in his note, and his accuſation.'

'Figure to yourſelf the uncertain ſtate of every citizen in theſe Republics. The ſame Body of magiſtracy has, as perſons executing the laws, all the power which it has given itſelf as Legiſlator. By its general decrees it may lay waſte the whole ſtate; and as it has moreover the ſole power of judging, it may deſtroy every citizen at its own pleaſure.'

'All power there becomes one power; and though there be no outward parade that diſcovers the deſpotic prince, yet is he felt every moment.'

'Moreover all princes who have ſought to make themſelves deſpotic, have ever begun with uniting all the magiſtracies to their own perſons, and many of the kings of Europe all the great offices of the ſtate.'

'I readily believe that the pure hereditary ariſtocracy of the Republics of Italy is not exactly correſpondent to Aſiatic deſpotiſm. The great number of magiſtrates may in ſome meaſure ſoften the magiſtracy; the whole of the nobility do not always concur in the ſame views; they have different tribunals and theſe qualify each other. Thus at Venice the Great *Council* has the legiſlative power, the *Prégady* the executive power, the *Quarantics* the power of judging. But the evil is, theſe different tribunals are formed of magiſtrates from the ſame Body, which makes them in a manner one and the ſame power.'

'The power of judging ought not to be delegated to a perpetual Senate, but ſhould be exerciſed by perſons ſelected from the body of the people †, at certain ſeaſons of the year, as preſcribed by law, to form a tribunal to be of no longer duration than neceſſity ſhall require.'

(*To be continued.*)

† As at Athens.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER VIII.

IIS DE REBUS AGIMUS, QUAE SUNT ETIAM NEGOTIIS ANTEPONENDAE.

CIC. DE NAT. DEOR.

(The Extract from Monteſquieu *continued.)*

HENCE the power of judging ſo tremendous to mankind, being confined neither to one ſet of men nor to any particular profeſſion, becomes in a manner inviſible and void. The people have not judges perpetually in their ſight, and the Magiſtracy is feared but not the Magiſtrates.'

'It is likewiſe neceſſary that in capital accuſations the criminal in concurrence with law, ſhould have the choice of his judges, or at leaſt that he may be entitled to except againſt ſo large a proportion of them, that thoſe which remain may be deemed of his own chuſing.'

'The other two powers might much better be entruſted with magiſtrates, or with a permanent body of men, becauſe they do not exert their force againſt any individual; the one being no other than the general will of the ſtate, and the other the execution only of that general will.'

'But though the Tribunals ought not to be fixed, yet ſo much ſhould the judgments there given be ſo, that they ought to be no other than the expreſs words of the law. Were they the private opinion of the Judge, mankind would live in ſociety without a preciſe knowledge of the contract in which he is thereby engaged.'

'It is even neceſſary that the Judges ſhould be of the ſame rank, or peers, of the perſon accuſed, that ſo he may not conceive an opinion that he is fallen into the hands of perſons inclined to injure him.'

'If the legiſlative ſuffers the executive power to have a right of impriſoning ſuch Citizens as will give ſurety for their behavior, Liberty is no more; unleſs they be taken into cuſtody to anſwer inſtantaneouſly to the charge, in an accuſation which the law has made capital; in which caſe they are truly free as they are ſubjected only to the authority of the Law.'

'But if the legiſlative power ſhould apprehend itſelf in danger, by any ſecret conſpiracy formed againſt the ſtate, or from a correſpondence with its enemies without; it might ſuffer the executive power for a time ſhort and limited, to take ſuch ſuſpected citizens into cuſtody, who would thereby loſe their liberty for a ſeaſon to preſerve it for ever.'

'And this is the only method conſiſtent with reaſon, to ſupply that tyrannical magiſtracy of the † *Ephores*, and the *State Inquiſitors* of Venice, who are as deſpotic.'

'As in a free ſtate every man who is reputed a free perſon, ought to be governed by himſelf; it ſhould ſeem that the legiſlative power was veſted in the collective body of the people. But as this is impoſſible ſo to be in large ſtates, and ſubject to many inconveniencies in ſuch as are ſmall; it becomes neceſſary the people ſhould do that by its repreſentatives which it was not able to accompliſh of itſelf.'

'Every man is much better acquainted with the wants of that town wherein he reſides, than with thoſe of other towns, and is a much better judge of the capacity of his neighbours than of the abilities of the reſt of his countrymen. The members of the legiſlative body, ought not therefore to be taken from the body of the nation indiſcriminately; but the inhabitants of the principal places ſhould chuſe from among themſelves their repreſentative.'

'The great advantage of repreſentatives is, that they are able to debate matters. To this the multitude is by no means adapted, which is one of the great inconveniencies of a democracy.'

'It is not neceſſary that the Repreſentatives who have received from their conſtituents a general inſtruction, ſhould receive from them a particular one on every tranſaction, as is the caſe in the Diets of Germany. True it is, that the words of the Deputy would thus more effectually expreſs the ſenſe of the people; but this practice would render all their tranſactions long and tedious, would make every Deputy paramount over

† The *Ephor* (Ἔφορος) was a magiſtrate of Lacedemon, whoſe power and authority were nearly the ſame with that of the Tribunes of the people in ancient Rome.

the

the reſt; and on the moſt urgent occaſions the whole ſtrength of the nation might be retarded by a ſingle caprice.'

'When the Deputies, as Sidney well obſerves, repreſent a body of people as in Holland, they ought to give an account to thoſe who have entruſted them; it is another matter when they are deputed by corporate towns, as in England.'

'All the citizens in the ſeveral diſtricts ſhould be entitled to give their votes in the choice of a repreſentative, thoſe only excepted who are reduced to ſo mean an eſtate, as not to be accounted to have any will of their own.'

'There was a great defect in moſt of the antient republics; which was that the people had a right to make active * reſolutions, which required execution, to which they were utterly inadequate. Their only buſineſs in government is to chuſe repreſentatives, which they are well qualified to do. For though there be few perſons who can preciſely determine the degree of capacity in other men, yet every one generally ſpeaking, has abilities ſufficient to diſtinguiſh whether or not the perſon he makes choice of is more enlightened than the generality.'

'Neither ſhould the repreſentative body be choſen to undertake any active reſolution, a buſineſs it could not properly execute; but to make laws, or to examine if thoſe it had enacted had been duly executed, which it might properly do, and which no other power than itſelf can effectually accompliſh.'

'In every ſtate there are perſons diſtinguiſhed by their birth, wealth, or honours; but were theſe to be confounded with the bulk of the people, and had they no voice but in common with others, the common liberty would become their ſlavery, and they would have no intereſt to defend, becauſe the generality of determinations would run counter to them. Their part of legiſlation therefore ought to be proportionable, to the intereſt they have in the ſtate; which they will attain, when formed into one body by themſelves, which has a right to ſtop the enterprizes of the people, as the people have a right to impede theirs.'

* *Des reſolutions actives* are the author's words. I have tranſlated them literally, *active reſolutions*, that is, ſuch as require ſpeed and diſpatch, both in the determination and execution. As the marching of an army to prevent or defeat a ſudden invaſion, or rebellion; the equipping and ſtationing a fleet for ſuch like purpoſes; with many more, which are properly acts appertaining to the executive power, which being in the hands of one perſon, he can reſolve and execute immediately. Whereas the legiſlative power conſiſting of a body of people might deliberate, debate, and delay.

'Thus

'Thus the legiſlative power will be veſted in a body of the nobility, and in a body which ſhall be elected to repreſent the people, each of which ſhall have its diſtinct aſſembly and councils, and ſeparate views and intereſts.'

'Of the three powers of which we have treated, that of judging is in a manner abſorbed. For the two others, as they ſtand in need of a ruling power to moderate them, that part of the legiſlative body conſiſting of nobles is very proper for that purpoſe.'

'The body of nobility ought to be hereditary. Such is its original nature; and moreover it ought to be deeply intereſted in the preſervation of its prerogatives, of themſelves odious, and which in a free ſtate are ever liable to danger.'

'But as an hereditary power might be induced to purſue its private intereſts, and to neglect thoſe of the people, it is neceſſary that in matters where a ſingular advantage might ariſe from corrupting it, as in thoſe laws which relate to the raiſing of monies, it ſhould have no ſhare in the legiſlation but by a negative voice, and not any power of appointing.'

'I call the * *power of appointing* the right of ordering by one's ſelf, or of correcting that which is ordered by another. And by a *negative voice*, I underſtand the right of making null and void a reſolution taken by any other; which was the power of the Tribunes of Rome. And though he who has the right of a negative voice, may have alſo the right of approving; yet this approbation here implies nothing more than a declaration, that he doth not at this time make uſe of his negative, and is content for the preſent to wave his right.'

'The executive power ſhould be in the hands of the Prince; becauſe this part of government, which generally requires an inſtantaneous execution, is more effectually adminiſtered by one than by more; whereas what depends on the legiſlative power, is generally better executed by numbers than by a ſingle perſon.'

'If there was no Prince, and the executive power was entruſted with a certain number of perſons, taken from the legiſlative body, Liberty would be no more; becauſe the two powers would be united, the ſame perſons having ſometimes, and being always capable of having, a ſhare both in the one and in the other.'

(To be continued.)

* The author's phraſe is *Facultée de Statuer*, i. e. *an authority to decree or ordain*, I have rendered it by *power of appointing*; the reader will make choice of either, it is immaterial which, as the term is immediately after defined. The like may be obſerved of that other phraſe *Faculté d'Empecher*, i. e. *authority to hinder or prevent*, which I have expreſſed by *negative voice* and ſometimes *negation*.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER IX.

IIS DE REBUS AGIMUS, QUAE SUNT ETIAM NEGOTIIS ANTEPONENDAE.

CIC. DE NAT. DEOR.

(The Extract from Monteſquieu *continued.)*

'IF the legiſlative body was to remain a conſiderable time, without being aſſembled, there would be an end of liberty. For one or other of theſe conſequences would enſue, either that there would be no more decrees of the legiſlature, and the ſtate would fall into anarchy; or that ſuch decrees would be continued on by the executive power, which would become abſolute.'

'It would be uſeleſs to keep the legiſlative body conſtantly aſſembled. It would be inconvenient to the repreſentatives, and too much engage the attention of the executive power, which could no longer think of executing, but of defending its prerogatives and the right which it poſſeſſes of executing.'

'Moreover was the legiſlative body to continue conſtantly aſſembled, it might ſo happen that nothing would more be thought of than ſupplying it with new deputies, to ſucceed ſuch of them as ſhould die; in which caſe, if the legiſlative body was once corrupted, the evil would be without remedy. While different legiſlative bodies ſucceed each other, the people entertaining an unfavourable opinion of the preſent legiſlative body, with reaſon extend their hopes towards another which is to ſucceed. But was it for ever to remain the ſame body, the people ſeeing it once corrupted could hope nothing from its laws; but would fly into rage or ſink into indolence.'

'The ~~executive~~ legislative body ought not to convene itſelf. For a body is judged to have no will but when aſſembled; and in caſe it did not unanimouſly aſſemble itſelf, it would not be eaſy to determine which part of it were the true legiſlative body, that which had aſſembled, or that which had not. That if it had a right to prorogue itſelf, it might ſo happen it never would prorogue itſelf; which would be dangerous in caſes where it might make attempts againſt the executive power. Beſides there are ſome ſeaſons more convenient than others for the aſſembling the legiſlative body: the executive power therefore muſt be that which is to determine the times for the convening and duration of theſe aſſemblies, guided herein by a knowledge of the circumſtances.'

'If the executive power has not a right to ſtay the actions of the legiſlative body, this laſt becomes deſpotic; for as it might veſt itſelf with all the power it could deviſe, it might annihilate all other powers.'

'But the legiſlative power ought not to have riciprocally a right to ſtay the executive power. For the executive part being by its very nature circumſcribed, it is unneceſſary to determine its bounds; beſides the executive power is generally employed in matters which are inſtantaneous. And the power of the tribunes of Rome was injurious not only that it put a ſtop to legiſlation, but even to the execution, from whence ſprung great evils.'

'But if in a free ſtate the legiſlative power ought not to have a right to ſtay the executive power, it has right and ought to have the power of examining after what manner the laws which it has made have been executed; and herein conſiſts the advantage of this government over that of Crete and Lacedemon, where the *Coſmes and Ephores* gave no account of their adminiſtration.'

'But how far ſoever this examination may extend, the legiſlative body ought to have no right to judge the perſon, nor of courſe the conduct of him in whom the executive power reſides. His perſon is ſacred in that he is neceſſary to the ſtate to prevent the legiſlative body from becoming a tyrant; at the inſtant he is accuſed or judged, liberty ceaſes.'

'In theſe caſes the ſtate would not be a monarchy, but a republic without liberty. But as he who executes cannot execute amiſs, without

out having evil counſellors and who have an averſion to laws as * miniſters, although favourable to them as men; theſe may be ſingled out and puniſhed. And herein it is that this government is preferable to that of *Gnidos*, where the laws not permitting the † *Amomines* to be arraigned not even after their ‡ adminiſtration, the people could never receive any ſatisfaction for the injuries they had done them.'

'Although generally ſpeaking the power of judging ought not to be united to any part of the legiſlature, yet this is liable to three exceptions founded on the particular intereſt of him who is to be judged.

'The great are ever expoſed to envy; and were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger, and not enjoy that privilege which the meaneſt citizen enjoys in a free ſtate, that of being judged by his peers. The nobility therefore ſhould be cited, not before the common tribunal of the nation, but before that part of the legiſlative body.'

'It may alſo happen that the law, which is at the ſame time both ſhort and clear-ſighted, might in ſome inſtances be too ſevere. But the judges of the nation are no more, as we have already ſaid, than the mouths which articulate the words of the law, inanimate beings unable to mitigate its ſtrength or rigor. It becomes then the buſineſs of the legiſlative body which as we ſaid before on another occaſion was a neceſſary tribunal, to be ſo in this likewiſe; it is a province of its ſupreme authority to mitigate the law in favour of the law itſelf, by pronouncing a ſentence leſs ſevere than the law of itſelf could do.'

'It might alſo happen, that ſome citizen in matters of a public nature might violate the rights of the people, and be guilty of crimes which the magiſtrates could not or would not puniſh. But generally ſpeaking the legiſlative power has no right to judge, and much leſs in this particular inſtance, where it repreſents the party intereſted, which is the people. All it can do therefore is to become accuſer. But before whom ſhall it accuſe? Shall it demean itſelf ſo far as to prefer an accuſation before the tribunals of the law its inferiors, and which beſides being made up of people

* It is worthy of obſervation that our ſenſible author ſuppoſes moſt miniſters, as miniſters to have an averſion to laws, it being by them alone that they are checked in their enterprizes; and thoſe ſchemes defeated which would otherwiſe ſubvert the liberties of a people: although as men, they muſt revere them, there being no ſafety to mankind without them.

† The people elected theſe magiſtrates every year, ſays our author, ſee *S. de Bizance.*

‡ The magiſtrates of Rome were liable to be accuſed when out of office. See *Denis Halicarnaſſus*, B. 9. in the caſe of *Genutius* the tribune. (Author's note.)

people like itſelf, would be led away by the authority of ſo powerful an accuſer. No; in order to ſecure the dignity of the people and the ſafety of the individual, it is neceſſary that the legiſlative part of the people ſhould accuſe before the legiſlative part of the nobility, which has neither the ſame intereſts nor the like paſſions with the other.'

'Herein conſiſts the ſuperiority of this government over moſt of the antient republics, in which was this defect, that the people were at the ſame time both judge and accuſer.'

'The executive power, as we have ſaid, ſhould take a part in the legiſlature, by its negation, without which it would ſoon be deprived of its prerogatives. But if the legiſlative power interferes in the executive part, the executive power will be alike ruined.'

'If the monarch took part in the legiſlation by a power of appointing, liberty would be at an end. But yet as it is neceſſary he ſhould have a ſhare in the legiſlation thereby to defend himſelf, he muſt take that part by his right of negation.'

'That which occaſioned the change of government in Rome was, that the ſenate which had a ſhare in the executive power, and the magiſtrates who had the other, had not like the people a negative voice.'

'Here then is the fundamental conſtitution of that government of which we ſpeak. Its legiſlative body being compoſed of two parts, the one will bind the other by the mutual power of its negative. Both will be connected together by the executive power which becomes no leſs ſo itſelf by the legiſlative power.'

'Theſe three powers ſhould be productive of reſt and inaction. But as the inevitable motion of things puts them under the neceſſity of moving, they are conſtrained to act in concert with each other.'

'The executive power making a part of the legiſlative only by virtue of its negative, it cannot enter into any debates. It is not neceſſary that it ſhould ſo much as propoſe, becauſe having always the right to diſapprove of its reſolutions, it can reject its determinations on ſuch propoſitions, which it would not have wiſhed to have been ſo determined.'

'In ſome of the antient republics where the people in a body debated on matters, it was natural enough that the executive power ſhould propoſe, and debate them with the people, without which there had been a ſtrange confuſion in all their reſolutions.'

[*To be continued.*]

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER X.

IIS DE REBUS AGIMUS, QUAE SUNT ETIAM NEGOTIIS ANTEPONENDAE.

CIC. DE NAT. DEOR.

(Concluſion of the Extract from Monteſquieu.)

'SHOULD the executive power appoint in the raiſing of the public monies, otherwiſe than by its aſſent, there would be an end of liberty, becauſe it would become legiſlative in the moſt eſſential point of legiſlation.'

'If the legiſlative power appoints, not annually, but for ever, the ſums to be raiſed on the public, it runs the hazard of loſing its liberty, becauſe the executive power will be no longer dependent upon it; and when ſuch a right is held for ever, it is immaterial whether it be held of one's ſelf or of another. The like will happen, if it appoints not annually, but for ever, the land and ſea forces with which it entruſts the executive power.'

'To prevent oppreſſion from him who is veſted with the executive power, the armies with which he is entruſted ſhould be a people, and ſhould poſſeſs the like mind with the people; as it was at Rome till the time of *Marius*. There are but two ways of effecting this, either that thoſe who are employed in the army, be perſons of ſufficient property to anſwer for their conduct to the reſt of the citizens, and that they be enliſted only for one year, as was the cuſtom at Rome; or if they are a perpetual body of troops, and the ſoldiers taken from the dregs of the people, the legiſlature muſt have the power of breaking them whenever it ſees convenient; that the ſoldiers ſhould live intermixed with the citizens, and that there be no ſeparate camp, barracks, nor fortreſſes.'

'The army when eſtabliſhed ought not to be immediately dependent on the legiſlative body, but on the executive power; and that from the nature of the thing; its province being rather action than deliberation.'

'Men are generally apt to imagine that courage is preferable to timidity, activity to prudence, might to counſel. An army will deſpiſe a ſenate, and reſpect its officers. It will hold in little eſtimation orders

given it by a body of men whom it may ſuſpect of timidity, and therefore unworthy to command it. As ſoon as the army becomes dependent ſolely on the legiſlative body, the government becomes military, and if the contrary has ever happened, it may be imputed to ſome extraordinary circumſtances. As when an army has been always ſeparated, when it has been formed of ſeveral diſtinct corps, each of which was dependent on its particular province; when the capital towns have been excellent fortreſſes, capable of defending themſelves merely from their ſituation, and in which there were no troops. Holland is in this reſpect more ſecure than Venice; it would preſently drown all her revolted troops, or might ſtarve them to death; for they are not quartered in thoſe towns that are capable of ſubſiſting them; that ſubſiſtence therefore becomes precarious.'

'Whoever reads that excellent work of *Tacitus* on the manners of the † Germans, muſt obſerve it is from that people the *Engliſh* have formed the idea of their political government. This admirable ſyſtem was found among woods.'

'As all human things come to an end, the ſtate of which we ſpeak will loſe its liberty, will periſh. *Rome*, *Lacedemon*, *Carthage* have periſhed. And this will periſh likewiſe whenever the legiſlative ‡ power ſhall become more corrupt than the executive.'

(*End of the* extract *from* Monteſquieu.)

The

† *De minoribus rebus principes, de majoribus omnes; ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium eſt apud principes pertractentur.* (The author's citation.)

‡ Becauſe a legiſlative body like that deſcribed, is liable to be prevailed on, if properly applied to, to reſign its legiſlative power. Which reſigned, and united to the executive power, liberty and the conſtitution would immediately be at an end; for a deſpotiſm takes place.

Hence it may be obſerved how momentous a buſineſs is that of electing members to repreſent the people in parliament. The ſecurity of our liberty and the ſafety of the conſtitution, are put into the hands of thoſe who have the power of chuſing theſe repreſentatives, who are to make ſo conſiderable a part of the legiſlative power. And if they ſhould chuſe ſuch as are corrupt, or liable to become ſo, a deſpotiſm muſt ſpeedily enſue.

A deſpotiſm would caſt us into the moſt abject ſlavery; and would were it poſſible, reduce us to a ſtate inferior to that of any people under heaven.

Yet ſo are we ſituated from the nature of our conſtitution, that the only alternative in the form of government remaining for us is that of a deſpotiſm. The reaſons for which may be collected from this work of Monteſquieu, B. 2. ch. 4. where he has the following paſſage: *The Engliſh in favor of liberty, have taken away all the intermediate powers that formed their monarchy. They have therefore great reaſon to preſerve that liberty; for ſhould they loſe it, there would not be a people upon earth in a more abject ſtate of ſlavery.*

I give it in the author's own words: "Les Anglois pour favoriſer la liberté, ont ôté "toutes les puiſſances intermédiaires qui formoient leur monarchie. Ils ont bien raiſon "de conſerver cette liberté; s'ils venoient à la perdre, ils ſeroient un des peuples des plus "eſclaves de la terre."

The ſtate of which we ſpeak will loſe its liberty; will periſh: are words which I hope will remain deeply impreſſed on the mind of every Engliſhman. And if this dreadful evil is ever to happen, let the preſent generation at leaſt be careful to remove far from itſelf the imputation of ſo dire a guilt, by delivering down to poſterity our liberties and the conſtitution as ſacred and unpolluted as we received them from our predeceſſors. This can be effected only by having recourſe to the firſt principle of the conſtitution; which indeed muſt be carefully examined into; for unleſs we diſcover on what it is founded, it will be impoſſible we ſhould know how to ſupport it with ſecurity in its declining ſtate.

Government is of three kinds, monarchical, ariſtocratical, and democratical; that of England comes under the former denomination; though at the ſame time it is very different from that of any other kingdom in the world. For of monarchical governments there are two kinds, the abſolute or deſpotic, and the moderate. An abſolute monarchy or deſpotiſm, is that of Muſcovy, Perſia, and others; a moderate monarchical government, is that of France or Spain. In the former, the will of the prince is the law of the ſubject: in the latter, the will of the prince is not altogether ſo abſolute and arbitrary, there being ſome fundamental laws of the conſtitution by which he muſt be guided, and over which his will cannot at all times prevail; though in all other reſpects as arbitrary, perhaps, as the former. But thank heaven! England is ſubject to neither of theſe kinds of government. For though it is a monarchy, yet is it a limited monarchy: and as the monarchies of France and Spain incline towards deſpotiſm; ſo on the other hand the government of England partakes of all the advantages of of a popular government, and is a happy mixture of the three kinds of government, the monarchical, ariſtocratical, and democratical. The executive power being placed ſolely in the prince, and the legiſlative power principally with the people; ſo that the prince himſelf is governed by law, that being ſuperior to every thing beſide.

This form of government calculated principally for the true glory of the prince, and the liberty of the people; and the people ſubject to it enjoying more liberty, than any ſubjects under any other government whatever, has for its firſt original principle VIRTUE; whereas in all deſpotiſms the firſt principle is FEAR. When I ſay VIRTUE I would not be miſunderſtood to mean mere moral, but political VIRTUE; by political VIRTUE, I underſtand that *amor patriæ*, that invincible love of one's country ſo inſeparable from the breaſt of every Roman, while yet they retained that purity and ſimplicity of ſentiment and manners which rendered them the admiration and glory of mankind; and which

which in times more degenerate they did not fail to * boaſt of, conſcious of its ſuperiority, and the glory ariſing from a virtue ſo venerable and ſacred. For this virtue is the baſe and foundation of all other virtues whatever; it is from hence they ſpring with true vigor, as from a native ſoil. In a deſpotic government this VIRTUE cannot exiſt, but inſtead thereof, *fear*. Can my country and its laws, my property, my wife, my children, my family, or any thing be deeply intereſting to me if I live under a deſpotiſm where the will of the prince is ſuperior to Law or Reaſon, can deprive me of all theſe in an inſtant? but if I live in a country where theſe are defended, and ſecured to me by law from any arbitrary will whatever, I immediately behold them in a different light; and I conſider them as my own. What ſentiments will not ariſe in my breaſt from this conſideration alone! How does it expand and dilate at the thought! What virtues will not ſpring from hence? What feats of heroiſm ſhall I be deterred from undertaking which tend to promote their defence and ſecurity?

Political VIRTUE and LIBERTY are therefore congenial; there can be no liberty if there be no virtue: the want of either effectually deſtroys the other. If therefore our liberties and the conſtitution are to be preſerved, recourſe muſt be had in degenerate times to its firſt principle, political VIRTUE, which is the very eſſence of its exiſtence; and if men will not ſacrifice every conſideration to *that*, and form their minds and actions on the original model and plan of the conſtitution, it is unreaſonable they ſhould expect the advantages and bleſſings reſulting from it. And indeed if they could, they would be utterly incapable of enjoying them; ſince, bleſſings as they certainly are to ſubjects properly qualified to receive them; they would become evils to minds languiſhing in corruption and degeneracy; and like ſtrong diet to a weak ſtomach, and conſtitution worn out by long diſeaſe and ſickneſs; which would but increaſe the malady, and haſten the diſſolution.

* Thus Horace, Lib. 3. Od. 2.

Dulce et decorum eſt pro patria mori.

To which virtue he alludes twice in the following verſes:

Audire magnos jam videor duces
Non indecoro pulvere ſordidos:
Et cuncta terrarum ſubacta,
Praeter *atrocem animum* Catonis.

Lib 2. Od. 1. & alibi.

And Tully abounds with ſentiments to this effect. I will mention but one:

Vigilare, adeſſe animo, ſemper aliquid pro republica aut cogitare, aut facere, aut dicere. Philipic 8. cap. 10. In which he ſeems to have deſcribed himſelf: and I could wiſh to be able to produce examples to rival him from among my countrymen. But we may ſay of true patriots, as of true oracles; they have ceaſed long ſince.

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER XI.

IN OMNES GENTES, IN OMNIA VENTURA SECULA PROSCRIPTI SUMUS, OMNES HAEC PRODIGIA NARRABUNT, OMNES EXECRABUNTUR NISI QUI NON CREDENT. QUINCT. DECL. 12.

AMONG the many irregularities during the long canvaſs of a conteſted election, there was not any which from the nature of its inſolence, and the malicious inſinuations thereby intended to be conveyed, put ſo high an affront on the public in general, or could be more juſtly obnoxious to individuals, than that proſtitution which was repeatedly made of the King's-arms, by carrying it ſo frequently through the ſtreets, raiſed on a pole, attended by a rabble rout, who ſeemed both by their actions, and expreſſions, to have been ripe for the execution of any project which ſhould have been further commanded them. As it cannot be conceived theſe men acted from their own heads, but from the *orders* of ſome other perſons whoſe heads however were very little wiſer than their own; I would apply myſelf to the wiſeſt of their managers in this affair, to be informed what *ſecret meaning and inſinuation* was implied by this very *extraordinary* procedure, in which they ſeemed ſo intemperately to vaunt and glory. And in the mean time I ſhall commit to their inſpection the idea which the public in general entertained of this proceeding; which they ſo juſtly eſteemed an offence of a very flagrant nature; and which, conſequently, excited their indignation againſt the deviſers and abetters of it.

The general opinion was, that the King's-arms were thus expoſed, not like the brazen ſerpent to heal, but to wound, and to intimidate the free electors, and their adherents. To caſt an odium on all who oppoſed that party which carried it about; inſinuating thereby, that they were perſons diſaffected to his MAJESTY, and his government, becauſe they would not come under a banner ſo impoliticly raiſed.

Such was the opinion of the public in general on this unprecedented tranſaction and conduct; and their indignation at the inſult offered to their liberties, though they had prudence enough to ſtifle it at the time, was juſtly fired, to ſee while the candidates were making intereſt with the electors to repreſent them as LEGISLATORS, and even during the time of that election, the King's-arms were carried about

as *in terrorem*. I would be glad to be informed with what propriety founded on our conſtitution, theſe *inſignia* could be brandiſhed on this occaſion. In my humble opinion, at that time, they were not only injudiciouſly, but even *criminally* introduced. The right of the people to chuſe without any moleſtation or influence whatever, and from any quarter ſoever, their members to repreſent them in parliament, is a right equally well founded by the nature of the conſtitution, as is any right whatever of the KING: and for any perſon to interfere therein in any kind or manner, ſo as to impede, is a manifeſt breach of the rights and privileges of the people of this kingdom; as much ſo, as for the people to take upon them to declare peace and war would be a breach of the prerogative of the crown. As the rights of the people, and the rights of the crown, are diſtinct and ſeparate rights, and equally alike well founded, ſo are they alike ſacred; and the crime is equally great in either caſe, by whomſoever invaded. The introducing therefore, and the frequent diſplaying of the King's-arms on this occaſion for the purpoſes before mentioned, if done by an order of the executive power, I do affirm to be a breach of the rights and privileges of the people of this kingdom; it is abſolutely an act of deſpotiſm; it is endevoring to ſuppreſs the free voices of the people in their election; it is reducing the people to ſlavery, and making the prince arbitrary to all intents and purpoſes. Was there an order iſſued for ſuch a proceeding from the executive power, I would rejoice to ſee by whom, and under whoſe hand ſuch order was iſſued, and the greateſt ſubject in the kingdom might have reaſon to tremble for the conſequence. The right of a free election uncontroled by inſinuations and menaces, is a right to the people too precious, too venerable, and too ſacred to be invaded, or even trifled with; it is the firm anchor, rock, and ſupport of their liberties: if they loſe this right, they loſe every thing, even to hope itſelf; and muſt ſoon be ſhip-wrecked in ſlavery. To what purpoſe then were theſe *inſignia* diſplayed in our faces; was it to let us know the hour was come, or the fatal day approaching?

But I am as well ſatisfied as that I am now writing, and I hope every man is as perfectly ſatisfied as myſelf, that no ſuch order was ever iſſued by the executive power, however alarming may have been the circumſtance, corroborated with inſinuations and expreſſions which came from the rabble at thoſe times. I ſay, I am well perſuaded it was deviſed by the managers of their party, as a kind of forgery of what they wiſhed for, but which could not be granted them. They had every man who was in the ſervice and pay of the government to vote for them, it is true; and *perhaps* theſe men, for I do not aver it, had *all* of them orders how they were to vote in this election: but government could not grant the other, to carry the King's-arms and therewith an order to threaten and ſtrike terror. This therefore was a device of the heads of their party; and fertile heads for invention they undoubtably had; deeply had they imbibed the nature of the conſtitution; and the liberties of the people had they much at heart, while they made uſe of theſe mock inſinuations and menaces of an arbitrary power. One may ſee throughout on what they had

had fixed their eyes, who ſtrove to make the executive power, by the imprudent uſe of theſe *inſignia* without its appointment and order, ſuſpected, by endevoring to give it the force of an arbitrary meaſure; ſo that all diſagreeable reflections ariſing therefrom might fall on the executive power itſelf. Nor was this all, for they endevored to make it appear engaged in a deſpotic manner, in a buſineſs where it could have no right whatever to influence: and where it would have been an invaſion of the rights of the people, in a moſt tender and eſſential point, to have interfered at all. Thus did theſe men proſtitute the enſigns of royal dignity, by making them ſubſervient to their flagitious purpoſes; and thus did they inſult the public in general, by making this attempt on the rights and liberties of the people: not to mention the other odious and execrable reflection, too unnatural even to be hinted at a ſecond time. Men of this complexion, who can contrive a ſham deſpotiſm to avail themſelves of it, in lieu of a real one which exiſts not, are undoubtably the proper creatures of a deſpotic government: and can any one queſtion they would be the leaſt averſe to introduce ſuch a government among us, and effectually to play their parts in it, when introduced?

Be the contrivers whom they may, it mitigates not the offence; there is no power in names to convert guilt into innocence: that was done which ought not to have been done, and nothing, that I know of, can exculpate the actors and abettors. No man can plead a right to violate the conſtitutional liberties of his countrymen ſo openly, and ſo repeatedly, by ſo foul and groſs an inſult. On the contrary, the higher the rank of thoſe concerned, the more flagrant the offence. *Haec enim conditio ſuperiorum eſt, ut quicquid faciunt, praecipere videantur: et perniciosiſſimus eſt malae rei maximus quiſque auctor.* As the ſame tranſaction was again repeated ſome days after, by the ſame party, at the county election; and as the minds of the people are ſtill diſſatisfied, and anxious to know on whom to charge the offence; it would give great ſatisfaction to no inconſiderable number of the free-holders of the county, and free-men of the borough, to find that the principals in thoſe two elections do diſavow that tranſaction; that ſo, even the idea of a ſuſpicion may be removed, (as the great from their ſituation are ever liable to envy and cenſure) and the inſult placed to the account of thoſe only who are deſervedly to become charged with it. This is the rather to be wiſhed for, as this tranſaction is not confined to the people of this county alone, but concerns all the people of the kingdom in general, who are alike deeply intereſted in this violation of their rights, and who ought to participate in the reſentment as the offence is univerſal; and which every man will do who ſets any value upon his liberties, or who has any regard for the conſtitution.

Incredible as it may ſeem, ſuch was the practice of a ſet of men who have always the word *liberty* in their mouths, and who *perhaps* would think themſelves injured ſhould we queſtion the ſincerity of their intentions, or ſuſpect their want of knowledge in that which they make ſo much talk about. But the myſtery unfolds itſelf when we come to define the term; by *liberty* they underſtand *licentiouſneſs*, and a right to do whatever they pleaſe, even to the maintaining of deſpotiſm itſelf; and where that is wanting,

ing, to forge it, rather than be without ſome ſhew of it, and enforce as far as they are able a ſham influence and authority in its ſtead.

For my part I look upon liberty as a civil inſtitution. It is a civil inſtitution becauſe it is ſubject to, and can only be claimed under the law. I ſpeak not of natural liberty, but of civil liberty; which were I to define, it ſhould be thus: true civil liberty is an obedience and ſubjection to the laws of that community in which we live, without being ſubject to the controle of any other power whatever. As to natural liberty it is a thing incompatible with men in a ſtate of civil ſociety, who have by contract on entering into civil ſociety given up their natural liberty (at leaſt in almoſt every inſtance) to partake of the advantages of civil liberty in a ſtate of civil ſociety; the abſolute neceſſity of which is too obvious to need any explication, ſince natural liberty and civil ſociety are things inconſiſtent with each other; and therefore, in civil ſociety, civil, and not natural liberty, is the higheſt point of liberty man can arrive at. To arrive then at this higheſt point of civil liberty, is to live in conformity to the laws of that community to which we belong: the means to deprive one's ſelf more or leſs of this civil liberty, is more or leſs to violate, by the number and nature of the acts we commit, the laws of that ſociety. To live conformable to its laws, is liberty; therefore, to violate its laws is a deprivation of liberty, becauſe puniſhments are thereby incurred; and every puniſhment whether pecuniary or corporal, is in fact a loſs of liberty. Offences are of different degrees, and wiſe legiſlators have always endevored to proportion the degree of puniſhment to the degree of the offence. The higheſt offence in civil ſociety where people enjoy civil liberty, is to deſtroy and ſubvert the laws of that community by which people are protected in their civil liberties; the next is to conſpire againſt the life of the chief magiſtrate wherein reſides the executive power, derived from the ſame principle, becauſe thereby the execution of the law is ſtopped. Theſe crimes, are named crimes of high treaſon, that is crimes of the higheſt nature and deepeſt guilt; crimes highly offenſive in the ſight of GOD and man. The guilty in one caſe, is termed traitor to his prince; in the other, traitor to his country. And as they are crimes of the higheſt nature, ſo the moſt ſevere of all puniſhments is annexed to them, death.

This is a ſhort ſketch of law, liberty, and ſociety, as they ſtand connected together in communities wherein people enjoy civil liberty: yet ſhort as it is, I hope it will be found expreſſive enough to give *ſome* people an inſight into the *poſſibility* of becoming traitors to their country, as well as to the prince. And therefore as ſome men by their actions ſeem to treat this kind of treaſon with a degree of indifference, I would ſincerely recommend to them for the future more circumſpection in a matter of ſo great concern and importance: and I think they cannot but ſhudder to ſee the near affinity of their offence with the crime here treated of. On which I leave them to reflect, together with the following paſſage from Tacitus, Ann. lib. 3, cap. 65. *Memoriae proditur, Tiberium, quotiens curia egrederetur, Graecis verbis in hunc modum eloqui ſolitum*, o homines ad ſervitutem paratos! *ſcilicet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tam projectae ſervientium patientiae taedebat.* If Tiberius could thus expreſs himſelf, ſurely then a good, a virtuous, and a juſt prince, would animadvert in terms no leſs ſevere on the conduct of thoſe men I have been ſpeaking of!

EUPHRASY.

NUMBER XII.

CUJUS-VIS HOMINIS EST ERRARE; NULLIUS, NISI INSIPIENTIS IN ERRORE PERSEVERARE. CIC. PHILIP.

I HAVE heard the Diſſenters boaſt they are a great body of people in this kingdom. That they are ſo great a body as they pretend to be, I very much queſtion. If they are ſo, I am ſorry for it. Nor can I be perſuaded that they ought, as conſcientious men, to be leſs ſo than myſelf: for every man has reaſon to be concerned, whenever he cannot comply with the laws of that country in which he lives, and had his being. That a Diſſenter doth not conform to the laws; that he ſpeaks as in triumph that he doth not do ſo; and that he boaſts of many others being in this reſpect in the like ſituation with himſelf; is ſo far from a juſt cauſe to exult in, that it beſpeaks a very weak head, or a very bad heart, in every one who doth ſo. I preſume however they are not yet ſo intoxicated with their ſucceſs in converting the people *from* the laws, but that they can ſtill look upon the act of toleration as an *indulgence* of the legiſlature towards them; though by their actions they would induce us to believe they confound a *toleration* with an *approbation*; which, give me leave to inform them, are two things very diſtinct: and in this caſe, a *toleration* is nothing more than an *indulgence*, which *indulgence* implies a *ſuſpenſion* of a right and authority, in commiſeration of their weakneſs. But to hear theſe men prattle, would one not imagine it was a *condeſcenſion* paid to their vanity, and perverſeneſs? and that *they* were the perſons who had waved their right; and the legiſlature, in their eſtimation, the objects of pity?

But the further we look into theſe men, the weaker we ſhall find them. Their actions are as incomprehenſible as their ideas. They are ever in extatic fits of perverſeneſs and inconſiſtency, their *teachers* only and the *clerks* of their conventicles excepted. Theſe, truly are rational men, and *know what they are about*; they act *conſiſtently*; and mean well *for themſelves*, in which they purſue one conſtant *even* tenor; though it muſt be confeſſed that kind of life is *rugged* enough to ſome of them: but this they are to expect with every man who goes out of a beaten path to encounter difficulties in the midſt of briers and brambles. With theſe men therefore I have no diſpute, nor ever will have; they ſeem already to have

work enough upon their hands to keep their fractious nurſery in a tolerable humour: if they cannot, no one elſe can; it is theſe alone can have any influence over them; they controle them better than all the reſt of the world put together; they can make them part with their money for nothing, or what is much the ſame, for a tale and a ſong; a tale without beginning, middle, or end, and a ſong without voice or harmony. In ſome parts of America, conjuring is inſeparably annexed to the prieſthood; in England, to diſſenting teachers; nothing leſs than ſuch an art could ſo beguile their gaping congregations as to make them exchange ſolid gold for empty ſounds; for while they tickle their ears with the oily feather of rhetorical nonſenſe, 'tis *Preſto, be gone!* and the money is conveyed out of their pockets. Not that their teachers are deficient in logic; but, generally ſpeaking, it is a Scotch logic, a pruriginous logic, a logic contacted with the itch of ſpeaking and haranguing *extempore* for an hour together, and ſaying *nothing*. Some perſons therefore have been of opinion, that their teachers are no *conjurors*; and that the money is conveyed from the pocket at thoſe times, while the congregation is *aſleep*. But I opine the matter to be as I have repreſented it: that their teachers are conjurors, and their congregations no wiſer than they ought to be. It is the duty of every man, who is able, to do good; preaching, and informing the minds of a miſguided multitude is doing good; their teachers therefore I hope will excuſe it, if I take upon me the liberty of preaching to their congregations *gratis*. I promiſe to embezzle none of the pay, nor to captivate by ſinging pſalms and hymns, which heaven never intended me for. And as I ſhall harangue them in a more public manner than they do themſelves, this I hope will exculpate me from having any ſiniſter views upon their flocks, to which ſurmize I might otherwiſe have been liable.

MEN and brethren of this kingdom, the diſciples of *Luther*, *Calvin*, or what other ſectariſts, ſince ye are divided and ſubdivided *in infinitum!* your religious principles I mean not to canvaſs; permit me to arraign you on the articles of oeconomy and prudence. Had ye not a light, whether or not of the underſtanding I pretend not to determine, which directed you to the knowledge of the religious errors of the Church of England? This, certainly ye had, or pretended to have, which with you, it ſeems, is the ſame thing. How then came it to paſs that this ſame light was ſo ſuddenly extinguiſhed in darkneſs, that you no ſooner diſcovered what was wrong, but you were left in the dark concerning what was right; and were neceſſitated to hire yourſelves teachers to point it out to you? One might have concluded as a natural conſequence, that as ye knew the evil, ye might by the ſame aid have diſcerned the good: but your concluſion determined otherwiſe; and as you perceived the evil, ſo any thing but that evil, was good. This reaſoning, my friends has led you into an expenſive error; moſt men are apt to imagine it is ſufficient to pay one teacher; the laws of your country have appointed you one, whom you *muſt* pay; and therefore you make choice of another whom you *will* pay: had they appointed you two, by the ſame ſpirit of reaſoning you would have had four. At preſent you have twice the number of other men; your wiſdom one would imagine ſhould be proportionable; and yet I do not

not perceive you are one jot wiſer than your neighbors, though in general you pay twice as much for it; which methinks, might tend to open your eyes though nothing elſe would: for the opening of the purſe, has frequently been found to enlarge the underſtanding, if there be any; and if there be none, how ſhould it be enlarged, though you had twenty teachers for that purpoſe? For I preſume, the moſt they pretend to is to cobble up the old work, they do not arrogate to themſelves the making of new, and it is well if they do not tinker the old till it is nought.

One would have imagined that as you fled from the Church of England, that you knew a better religion. That you did not, your hiring of other teachers plainly evinces. Can it be a good excuſe for your leaving the Church, that ye knew not a better religion and are reduced to pin your faith on other men's opinions? You could but have done this with the eſtabliſhed religion, without being ſo liable as ye now are of being deluded. An eſtabliſhed clergy have not the like motives to deceive, as your teachers; the former are to be paid whether or not you chuſe to be inſtructed by them; your teachers can only be paid ſo long as you pleaſe to retain them for that purpoſe: it is therefore their buſineſs to deceive you by leading you away from the eſtabliſhed Church, if they mean to live by you. You are the only people he can trafic with, and every man expects to be a gainer by thoſe with whom he trafics; therefore I do not ſee what gain you are to have from him, who expects to have all his gain from you. You may picque yourſelves if you will on your policy; but yourſelves muſt acknowledge the policy of the Quakers far exceeds all you can pretend to. In their conception the Church is erroneous. What then? they depart from the Church, and are guided in religious matters by their own underſtandings. They are well aware of the abſurdity of relinquiſhing one profeſſion, till they have a better, as they think, to lay hold on. They are appriſed of the folly of leaving one ſet of teachers, to hire another who are as liable to miſtake; and to pay two, inſtead of one for wrong inſtruction. They conſider it as ſafe, and much cheaper, to inſtruct one's ſelf wrong, as to pay twice over for being miſled. And that the likelieſt means to get bad inſtruction in this caſe, is to pay extraordinarily for it; ſince there will be men always to be met with who will teach any new doctrines, and deviſe any new ſyſtems; if dupes can be found to pay them for their trouble, to ſupport them, and to give them countenance in it.

I will not enquire into thoſe nice diſtinctions you make in religious matters; and which have induced you to ſeparate from the church, the eſtabliſhed religion. I confeſs, I am not maſter of ſuch ſubtle diſquiſitions. Nor did I ever converſe with two Diſſenters in my life that were ſo. Without contempt of your abilities, I will venture to ſay there is not one in a thouſand among you who is capable of forming an adequate judgment of this matter. To reaſon well on abſtruſe and intricate points, and to determine thereon with juſtneſs and preciſion, what qualifications are neceſſary! what qualifications are not abſolutely requiſite? What force of judgment; what ſtrength and powers of underſtanding; what clearneſs and

and perſpicuity of diſcernment; what extent of memory! To theſe rare gifts of heaven, muſt be added human acquiſitions of art and ſcience; (unleſs you pretend to a divine inſpiration, which it is evident you have not, for then you would need no other teachers). What time, what labor, what pains, what aſſiduity to acquire theſe! Few men have leiſure for this purpoſe, and fewer ſtill if they had, could make that progreſs I am ſpeaking of, and arrive at that maſterly reaſoning by which alone are to be developed thoſe logical ſubtleties drawn through an almoſt endleſs chain of propoſitions, ideas, and arguments, and which, running along every link and connecting them together, are to common underſtandings deluſive, and to vulgar eyes utterly imperceptible.

Seeing theſe things are ſo, is it not plain you are deluded? You ſeparate from the eſtabliſhed Church, not on account of idolatry and ſuperſtition which ſhe abhors, and which might come under the cognizance of common ſenſe and reaſon; but on account of ſome nice doctrines and abſtruſe points; to compare which with others, and to determine thereon with preciſion, you are utterly unqualified for, totally unequal to, and in which reſpect, at beſt, you can but depend on the opinions of your teachers, whoſe intereſt it is to deceive you; who have never yet, nor is it likely they ever will prove thoſe doctrines of theirs are preferable to the other; they are by moſt men held not ſo good; let us impartially take the medium, and ſuppoſe them equal. What then is this but a convincing reaſon why you ought not from motives of prudence and juſtice, for your own intereſt and that of the ſtate, to ſeparate and divide yourſelves from the eſtabliſhed Church?

You ſee then, there is neither oeconomy nor prudence in your ſcheme. If ye are men, ye will emancipate yourſelves: and if ye love your country, you will breed no ſchiſms nor diſcords in her breaſt. —— I take my leave of you in the words of the apoſtle: "If there be any virtue, or if there be any praiſe, think on theſe things."

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THE END.

ERRATA.

PAGE 2. line 30, for *ſenſibilty* read ſenſibility. P. 10. l. 8. after *from* inſert *my*. P. 13. l. 2. for VITUS read VITIJS. P. 14. l. 7. for *pariſioners* read *pariſhioners*. P. 14. l. 13. for *pariſhoners* read *pariſhioners*. P. 14. l. ult. for *ſeperating* read *ſeparating*. P. 15. l. 5. for BY-LAW read BY LAW. P. 15. l. 10. for *impracticble* read *impracticable*. P. 18. l. 1. for *converſation* read *converſation*. P. 22. l. 11. for *tracking* read *hacking*. P. 22. l. 28. for *acting* read *aching*. P. 22. l. 35. for *aſſimulate* read *aſſimilate*. P. 22. l. 38. for *planets* read *planet:* and for *inexhauſable* read *inexhauſtible*. P. 23. l. 29. after *machine* put a comma, and dele the comma after *cowl*. P. 23. l. 48. for *caſe* read *eaſe*. P. 32. l. 3. for *ſeperate* read *ſeparate*. P. 34. l. 1. for *executive* read *legiſlative*. P. 38. l. 5. for *ſeperated* read *ſeparated* P. 39. l. 39. for *inſeperable* read *inſeparable*. P. 40. l. 9. dele *is*. P. 40. l. 28. after *and* inſert *be*. P. 12. l. 9. *dependance* read *dependence*.